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Abstract 
At the end of his book, La Chair des Mots, politiques de l'écriture (1998), Jacques 
Rancière evokes a wall, a frontier, in the nomad and plastic thinking of Gilles Deleuze. 
The approach is twofold: on the one hand, literary, summoning affections and concepts 
but, above all perceptions, these conceptual characters that Deleuze inaugurates in a 
between-two of philosophy and literature, «philosophiture», he would say, or 
«literasophy»; on the other hand, it is political, evoking the horizontality and verticality, 
equality and difference of a people to come. In both cases, Rancière envisions the 
possibility of a Deleuzian wall, which would be something of the order of the frontier. We 
know how Deleuze abhorred frontiers and, at least, among it, he would agenciate cracks 
and lines of passages, lines of escape, lines of flight. To retake the idea that Jacques 
Rancière explores in his text entitled Deleuze, Bartleby, and the literary formula, there 
would be a wall in Deleuze's thought, a limiting barrier of his own thinking. The end or 
the cut of the flow, according to Rancière, is stated as it: «The strength of any strong 
thought is also the ability of disposing itself its aporia, the point where it no longer 
passes». Now, Deleuze avoid the point, «to make the point» repulses him, always 
prefering the line. So this wall-end-point could not be a strong aporia in the bosom of a 
strong thought without also being a line of escape, a passage, an opening or a pause 
before gaining speed again. A wall of slowness to better accelerate. Here is what this 
article proposes to enunciate: from the characters that Deleuze extracts from the novels 
of the authors and the literature he appreciates to reach the haecceities, these a-
subjective singularities that are not identities but are perfectly individuated, to assure 
them a territory and a voice, the possibility of the univocity of an European people to 
come. 
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Where life clogs us, intelligence opens a way, 
because if it is true that there is no remedy for an unshared love, 
the truth is that we escape the verification of a suffering, 
let alone be his by drawing the consequences it entails. 
Intelligence doesn't know these closed situations of dead end life 
 
Marcel Proust 
 
Opening 
This article is an attempt to conclude what seemed to us an unconcluded text by 
Jacques Rancière about deleuzian proposal of a literary formula in Melville’s 
Bartleby novel. At the end of his book La Chair des Mots, politiques de l’écriture 
[The Flesh of Words: the Politics of Writing] (1998), Jacques Rancière evokes a 
wall or a barrier in the nomadic, open and fluid thought of Gilles Deleuze. The 
approach is twofold: on one hand, it is literary, calling upon affects and concepts 
but above all percepts, those conceptual characters that Deleuze inaugurates in 
an ‘entre-deux’ (or in-between) of philosophy and literature – philosophiture, he 
would say, or literasophy 1
To return to the idea that Jacques Rancière explains in his text entitled Deleuze, 
Bartleby et la formule littéraire [Deleuze, Bartleby, and the Literary Formula], 
there exists a wall in Deleuze’s thought, a barrier-limit to his own thought. It is 
the end or the cutting of the flow, according to Rancière: “the strength of any 
strong thought is also its ability to arrange its aporia itself, the point where it 
; on the other hand, it is political, evoking the 
horizontality and verticality, the equality and difference, of a people to come. In 
both cases, Rancière sees the possibility of a Deleuzean wall, which would be 
something similar to a border. We know how Deleuze abhorred borders unless it 
was to open up gaps in them as well as lines of passage, lines of flight. 
                                                 
1 Deleuze, Gilles: Littérasophie et Philosofiture, interview with Hélène Cixous; in Dialogues, 13 
November 1973, p. 30. The title comes from the text transcribed from a radio programme of 
Roger Pillaudin on France Culture. The creation of concepts, through voluntary excess, so dear to 
Gilles Deleuze especially in his works with Félix Guattari, is clearly evident in the title of this 
programme in which philosophy and literature dance around, changing position, in the different 
zones of the written word in order to compose and re-compose themselves, expressively different, 
but with a force that is the same, that of the differentiation of the majority pattern of these two 
disciplines. It is in the ‘entre-deux’, the in-between, that the movement (of thought) accelerates 
and intensifies to create the concept. 
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can no longer pass”. However, Deleuze detests the point; he always prefers the 
line. Therefore, this wall-final point could not be a strong aporia within a strong 
thought without also being a line of flight, a passage, opening or resting place 
before picking up speed again. A wall of slowness to accelerate better. What this 
article proposes is to start from the characters that Deleuze extracts from novels 
by the authors and of the literature he appreciates, as is the case of Charlus 
(Proust) or Bartleby (Melville), in order to reach the haecceities (Duns 
Scot/Simondon), these a-subjective singularities that are not identities but are 
perfectly individuated to ensure them a territory and a voice, the possibility of 
the univocity of a people becoming, a people to come, fleshed out by haecceities 
in individuation. 
So, could we conceive such a Deleuzean wall as being a murmur of Rancière’s 
instead, which might be knocked down and transformed into a wall of free 
stones, in an intifada that knocks down the univocity of the wall to counter it 
with the equivocity of the stones? But will it still be possible to find one single 
voice, that European voice, for all the modes that, in the difference, repeat it? It 
would be necessary to revisit Spinoza and the procedure of modes to find this 
European immanence for a people to come. 
Let us rather think about cutting the flow at the end of this line of flight as if a 
line with an end did not immediately become a segment, a line segment that can 
be remounted, enchained and provide material for the reconstruction of 
continuity and new lines of flight. Ultimately, the wall that Jacques Rancière 
builds at the limits of Deleuze’s thought could be constituted, or not, as the 
element where the shock of heterogeneous elements produces light. Does that 
light here illuminate the path that is always to be trodden by a [European] 
people in permanent (re) construction? 
 
Attempt at concluding a text to be concluded: about the formula 
To return to the idea that Jacques Rancière develops in his text Deleuze, 
Bartleby et la formule littéraire (1998) in which, based on an excerpt where 
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Gilles Deleuze discusses what a world “in process” or “an archipelago” would be 
like, which is one of fraternal individuals – “a wall of loose, uncemented stones 
where every element has a value in itself but also in relation to the others” 
(Deleuze apud Rancière, 1998, p. 1992
However, Deleuze detests the point, he does not like to point, either in the 
numerical sense or in the sense of the French expression faire le point or “to 
take stock of a situation”. He always prefers to trace a line, a line of flight, by 
dint of the vital movement of all the lines of life. This geometric aversion is 
sufficient to refute the forced reading that Jacques Rancière makes of the extract 
regarding the Melvillean brotherhood in Bartleby, ou la Formule, this wall-final-
point-of-Deleuzean-thought; it could not be a strong aporia within a strong 
thought without being, simultaneously, a line of flight, a line of exit or a line of 
passage, a passage and opening, a resting place before once again taking up, at 
great speed, the movement of thinking. If we are attentive to this wall of loose 
stones – without succumbing immediately to the dictum of the mental image 
that shows us piles of granite stones in the open fields of southern Europe where 
mammals (goats, sheep, dogs and men), reptiles (lizards and snakes), birds and 
plants (brambles, blackberry bushes and moss) open up cracks and climb over 
with the greatest ease and naturalness of their animal and vegetable and 
mineral vitality – slowly so as to accelerate more quickly. 
) – he defends that a Deleuzean wall will 
therefore exist that is a barrier-limit to his own thought: “And this is exactly 
what Deleuze does here when, in one single gesture, he clears the way of 
Deleuzism and sends it into the wall” (idem, p. 203). The end or the cutting of 
the flow of all Deleuze’s thought, according to Rancière, clashes with this aporia: 
“the strength of any strong thought is also its ability to arrange its aporia itself, 
the point where it can no longer pass” (ibidem). 
This is what we propose here: to start from the characters that Deleuze extracts 
from the tales, novellas and novels of North American authors, and to forget 
Antonin Artaud (body without organs), Henri Michaux (multiplicities and 
properties), Franz Kafka (minorities) and a biased appreciation of Proust by the 
                                                 
2 Translator’s note: All the references in this article refer to the French editions in the bibliography. 
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simple reading that Rancière applies to the commentaries that run through all 
Deleuzean thought, would be to once again cement Deleuze’s free thinking that, 
above all else, is made up of the creation of concepts – those loose stones that 
produce thought in their movement in an autonomous and heteronomous league 
(the “crowned anarchy” of which Deleuze speaks at the end of Différence et 
Répétition, 1968). Let us remember that through both French writers and 
American ones, Deleuze passes from romanesque characters to conceptual 
characters and, from there, to singular forces, pure relata, which are the 
haecceities3. This occurs in the case not only of the Baron de Charlus, who in the 
curvature of his voice and the elevation of his nose embodies the features of a 
whole blood-related people, a genetic brotherhood that circulates through the 
arteries of his literary and literal body, but also in the pure affirmation of 
Bartleby’s non-affirmation, which is the expressive voice of the immanence of a 
singular, but not subjective or, rather, a-subjective, voice: that is to say, 
individuation by haecceity. In order to reach the haecceities, to reach 
individuation through the text, what Deleuze does is not build a wall but rather 
the composition of an ontographic plane4
Rancière further disagrees (using the argument of Alain Badiou that reduces 
Deleuzean univocity not to an expressive modal multiplicity like Spinoza’s but to 
an original unicity that is contrary in every way to Deleuze’s theories of 
differential multiplicity) that this wall is a wall of non-passage, a total wall where 
“we do not go on, from the multitudinous incantation of Being, toward any 
political justice. Literature opens no passage to a Deleuzean politics” (Rancière, 
1998, p. 202). After the Rancierian terms, the argument: “There is no Dionysian 
, where the lines of text are lines of life 
and where the writing plane is a vital plane of composition between the 
autonomy and the heteronomy of the characters who emit signals (more than 
signs); we can talk of an ontonomy. A being of the names that are, like in 
Proust, like in Nietzsche, a wind. 
                                                 
3 Cf. 1730 – Devenir-intense, devenir-animal, devenir-imperceptible in Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, 
Félix. (1980). Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2: Mille plateaux. Paris, Minuit. 
4 Cf. Lima, Luís (2013). Ontografias da Imanência (de Deleuze a Proust e volta), respigar, compor, 
expressar. PhD thesis in Aesthetics. Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova 
de Lisboa. DOI: https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/10188/1/luislima .pdf. Accessed on 15/07/19.  
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politics”. And “as loose as its stones might be,” this wall “is that in front of which 
the joyful expansion of the philosophers children of Dionysus is halted” (ibidem). 
Why would children stop in front of such a wall of loose stones instead of 
climbing over it as all children do, as goats, sheep, brambles and lizards do? The 
reason, concludes Rancière, is that the philosopher did not want disciples; 
Deleuze, like Dionysus, like Nietzsche, did not want disciples. To say, as Jacques 
Rancière does, that Dionysus did not appreciate philosophers but only asses is to 
forget that Zarathustra, in the cave at the top of the mountain with his animals, 
knew the answer the ass would always give him, his “Ye-a”, the affirmative 
consent characteristic of the German people. Zarathustra was seeking other 
actors, other flights, coming out from his cave at the top of the mountain where 
he established himself on a plane of free thinking: a plateau. What is the top of 
a wall but a micro-plane, a mountain plateau? But, naturally, without asceticism. 
Let us then look more closely at the wall of loose stones of Bartleby, of Melville, 
of Deleuze, and at the context from which the passage cited by Rancière was 
taken: 
It is first of all an affirmation of a world in process, an archipelago. Not 
even a puzzle, whose pieces when fitted together would constitute a 
whole, but rather a wall of loose, uncemented stones, where every 
element has a value in itself but also in relation to others: isolated and 
floating relations, islands and straits, immobile points and sinuous lines – 
for Truth always has “jagged edges.” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 110) 
What force does the term “wall” have if it is made of loose, uncemented stones? 
Is it not just one more Deleuzean oxymoron, one more topological object like 
the Möbius strip or Klein’s Bottle, more than surface and less than volume, or an 
object with n dimensions in the Riemannian space which is the topological space 
by nature of the vitalism of Deleuzean ontology? We read “process”, “loose 
stones”, “uncemented”, “relation”, “floating relations”, “islands and straits”, 
“immobile points”, “sinuous lines”, “archipelago”; Jacques Rancière wants to 
read “wall”, despite the warning Deleuze gives later on in the same paragraph: 
“But to reach this point, it was also necessary for the knowing subject, the sole 
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proprietor, to give way to a community of explorers, the brothers of the 
archipelago, who replace knowledge with belief – or rather with ‘confidence’, not 
belief in another world, but confidence in this one, and in man as much as in 
God […] Pragmatism is this double principle of archipelago and hope” (idem, p. 
111). 
However, the archipelago is everything except the community. And this is what 
Rancière fears. The crowned anarchy of Deleuzean politics is incompatible with 
the emancipating programme of the community to come. Even though the 
master might be ignorant, he knows that he must emancipate. Nor is it a 
pedagogy, and this is why Deleuze is the friend of children, of the children-
philosophers or indeed of philosophy’s childhood, its happiness and sense of 
humour, as in Nietzsche. And this is why we can look at the “wall of loose 
stones” of the Melvillean brotherhood, of an anarchism of becoming, in the light 
of another formula, not that of Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” but rather of 
the Deleuzean formula for the univocity of being. 
There is an aesthetic line inaugurated by Gilles Deleuze. But it is a line that is 
traced much earlier than is usually mentioned. It is not then with Francis Bacon 
(1984) or with the two volumes on cinema (1983 and 1985), or even with 
Critique et Clinique [Critically and Clinically] (1993) that the philosopher 
dedicates to literature. It is, for us, in the movement of his philosophical plane, 
in the movement that draws abstract lines that become lines of thought that 
become concrete, material and aesthetic, and that seek to affirm an ontology of 
univocity through movements of expressivity, difference, individuation. 
Everything was pointing in this direction ever since his commentary on 
expressivity in Spinoza (1968). After this date there is a dance that involves the 
works Différence et Répétition and Logique du sens [The Logic of Sense], and, to 
a certain extent, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2: Mille plateaux [A Thousand 
Plateaus] and Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie? [What is Philosophy?] since in these 
two works written with Félix Guattari, expressivity changes and the ritornello 
movement appears intermittently. To be more specific, let us think of the 
number of phrases constructed with the same expressive rhythm in Différence et 
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Répétition and Logique du sens. True refrains, or ritornellos. Here are two 
examples: 
The univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, and that 
it is said in one and the same “sense” of everything about which it is said. 
That of which it is said is not at all the same… (Deleuze, 1997, p. 211) 
Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, 
but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself. (Deleuze, 
1968, p. 53) 
The first is taken from Logique du sens and the second comes from Différence et 
Répétition. What we want to say is that the movement of thought immanent to 
its expression is the force of aesthetic individuation, the unique feature of a style 
that Deleuze had never abandoned, not even in his partnerships with Félix 
Guattari. The style changes. It becomes, however, faster, more peopled with 
concepts; it has accelerations and de-accelerations that are much more intense 
than in his first solo books. But this winning formula, because it is hypnotic like a 
refrain, a ritornello (which is, let us not forget, a force of affectation and 
aesthetic production by its very nature, according to Deleuze and Guattari), 
emerges uninterruptedly here and there. Years and years on end until the final 
text. The formula for defining univocity serves to define all the concepts that are 
inscribed within Deleuzean ontology – plane of immanence, body without 
organs, haecceities, rhizome, transcendental field, event. And there will be 
more. The expressive formula of the notion of ontology in Deleuze may be 
reduced to ‘all minus 1’ as long as it is expressed in the same differential 
movement of the formula of the univocity of the being. In other words, One is 
equal to everything that is unique, but that which is said to be unique differs, 
the unicity is the difference itself. And if this is the Same, it can only be the 
Same in its Multiplicity. First, then, is the difference, which is pure Multiplicity. 
Hence the immanence of the multiplicity to the one. Hence the perverse turn 
that makes the transcendental a field of pure immanence. Hence the 
transcendental empiricism hailed by Deleuze. Now, in aesthetic terms, to reduce 
Deleuzean expressivity to this formula does not seem much, but it is precisely 
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following this same formula that one can argue: this singular movement of 
thought has an imperceptible becoming that makes it a pure multiplicity. 
Each stone only has a value as an autonomous element in that it is relational: 
internal autonomy of elements, internal heteronomy of the whole, external 
ontonomy of the wall, which is an archipelago and a ‘plage d’immanence’ 
[expanse (or zone) of immanence]… Is not sand more than a wall of loose 
grains, a wall fallen near the sea, that other moving mass where all the drops 
have one single movement for all the differentiated waves? 
A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single 
and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings: 
on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the 
state of excess – in other words, the difference which displaces and 
disguises them and, in turning upon its mobile cusp, causes them to 
return [author’s italics] (Deleuze, 1968, p. 389). 
If a certain movement of Deleuzean thought is taken up again, it becomes clear 
that the wall, lying down, becomes the path, a plane, a Möbius strip, more than 
a point and less than a line, more than a line and less than a surface (because it 
is full of holes, it contains fissures, cracks, intervals released by the absence of 
cement, which allows the two sides of the surface of this wall of loose stones to 
be reunited), a wall with fissures. A plane of composition that at times re-erects 
itself vertically (a white wall since verticality is white and horizontality is black) 
to constitute a longitude and, with a latitude, form a body that establishes the 
necessary cuts so that the whole ontological project avoids falling into madness, 
or the void into death. This wall, then, will be prudence. Michaux calls it the 
awakening: “... at last, with no warning, no preparation, there comes into the 
cage of the enormous and enormously empty edifice of bone and fog, there 
comes into me with no further delay a vertical surge” (Michaux, 1999, pp. 51-
56). Repose of the vague nomadic body that becomes a wall, like the prow of a 
ship so as not to founder in the smooth or striated waters of an ocean of flows.  
White wall, black hole. White vertical and black horizontal. Coordinates are 
needed to make a body. Extension and intensity. And prudence to avoid falling 
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into madness, into excess, into chaos. It is a wall of loose stones, a wall of 
fraternal freemasonry, loose blocks or stones of an apocryphal church (a 
crowned anarchy), the followers of a Christ free of the cross, which is equivalent 
to the immanence of the moribund and is the sign of a life, pure indiciality: ecce 
for haecceity, as in ecce homo 5
Blocks of literary, poetic, expressive intensities, the crowned anarchies 
correspond in the Deleuzean ontological dispositif to the principle of neutral 
individuation and to the haecceity of the moribund and the newborn
. Multiplicity and haecceity which, singular, 
crucified without a cross and moribund is always newborn, neutral, thus 
becoming univocal; the univocity of the being that is voice: “the unique being 
with a thousand voices”, a path made up of one thousand stones. 
6. The stones 
of the Palestinians7
 
 correspond to the moving wall, the wall of resistance and 
affirmative production of the negation or a-affirmative – I would prefer not to – 
of individuation of a people. A wall of stones for prudence still, to counter the 
hegemony of the open flow that can be imported for the current model of 
European construction. Can Europe include walls of loose stones, uncemented 
borders both within itself and on its edges? 
Autonomy, heteronomy and ontonomy 
To try to respond it is necessary to specify even more: between autonomy and 
heteronomy, it is necessary to push, apply pressure, go further and force 
through the middle so as to be able to intuit in practice what value Deleuze’s 
words have – he defended that it is necessary for the wall (theory) to become 
opening (practice). It is in the practice of writing and literal reading that the 
aesthetic forces come to life. It is necessary to make the ‘entre-deux’ flow, a 
                                                 
5 On the concept of haecceity and its etymological genealogy and for a clarification on the quiddity 
of the term haecceitas in contrast with the indicial character of haecceity Cf. Lima, Luís (2008). 
Estética da Ecceidade, Coimbra, MinervaCoimbra. 
6 Cf. Deleuze, Gilles (1995): L’Immanence: une vie..., in Gilles Deleuze – Philosophie, n.º 47, ed. 
Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris. 
7 Cf. Deleuze, Gilles (2003): Les Pierres, in Deux Régimes de Fous, ed. Les Éditions de Minuit, 
Paris. 
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pure haecceity: that is the ontonomy of an individual and collective life, 
multiplicity and becoming of Europe. 
To open up a path here walking over a fallen wall, a plane of consistency with no 
cement, in which the link is that of the loose affinities of the crowned anarchy 
[anarchy of loose stones, non-monarchic crown of the link between 
heterogeneous elements, once again, the differential movement of the univocity 
of the being], will be, for literature, a voice that becomes a path. It will be a life 
that becomes written, and returns, since the movement is always reversible like 
the double face of topological surfaces – and this is a Möbius wall. And if we 
follow Deleuze’s advice, and if we make grass grow between the stones, make 
what is vegetable grow between what is mineral, the rhizomes will grow in the 
middle, a link of heterogeneous elements like the citizens of a Europe always to 
come. 
Returning to another criticism that Jacques Rancière formulates regarding 
Deleuze’s text on Bartleby – how can he [the philosopher] simultaneously reject 
the structure of the narratives and the subjectivity of the characters and set up 
his own discourse through the words of these characters – let us pay attention 
to these characters. And to what they are. With Deleuze we are dealing with 
conceptual characters, not with literary subjectivities. They are percepts, in 
other words, blocks of perceptions, cuts and captures in the continuous flow of 
aesthetic perception8
Therefore, one could say that it deals with a people to come in this ontonomy of 
the literary walls of loose stones. Thus, Deleuze’s wall is revealed to show what 
it has that is the most dense: its passages and lines of passage, its links, its 
ontonomies that are also ontonymies. Proper nouns, singular blocks, which in 
relation one with each other and one to each other effect a composition of 
Europeans to come. 
. Since the haecceities are singular but impersonal, they are 
blocks of affects and concepts, intense fragments of percepts; they are in a 
constant relation on the plane of immanence which is a wall of loose stones. 
                                                 
8 Cf. Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Félix (1991): Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie?, ed. Minuit, Paris. 
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They are signs more than signals, whether they be signs of percepts (conceptual 
characters), moved by heteronomy, or affects (impersonal intensities), moved 
by autonomy, or concepts (ideas turned into expressions), moved by ontonomy. 
A whole economy of the signs of becoming are established by means of a 
univocal attraction of the multiplicities in this wall of loose stones, ruled by the 
laws of hospitality of a nomos with n dimensions. Heteronomy, autonomy and 
ontonomy: the three terms of the economy of the signs of a people to come who 
are sometimes moved by form, sometimes by the material, sometimes by the 
composed. But nomos is also name, the name of a force, of an individuation and 
event, as can be read in the writings of Deleuze: Molloy, Charlus, Swan, 
Bartleby, Achab, Alice and so many other names of conceptual characters in a 
multitude of ontographic writing, a bio-writing. Let us also speak then with 
Fernando Pessoa of heteronymy, orthonymy and ontonymy. The multiplicity of 
all the voices that repeat the difference of one single voice: univocity of the 
being that is expressed and expresses its differential multiplicity, a wall of loose 
stones. 
Let us imagine them all for a moment: Charlus, Achab, Bartleby, Molloy, K., 
Alice, Roberte (from Proust, Melville, Beckett, Carroll and Klossowski). They are 
a whole people. The people of whom Jacques Rancière speaks, paraphrasing 
Gilles Deleuze, when of them it is said they are to come, a missing people or a 
people who are coming. To imagine is not the most appropriate term since it 
does not concern images but rather names of forces. Let us then not imagine a 
scenario peopled with characters; allow us rather to capture, or let us capture 
the forces immanent to these events-names, in a collective assemblage on the 
surface that is the wall of loose stones of literature-life: ontography. It concerns 
therefore a free thought that moves concepts, since the stones are loose, to find 
a textual or textuated people, composed of affectual-signs, perceptual-signs and 
conceptual-signs, all on the same plane, a plane of immanence of literature on 
thought and of thought on life. This people of ontonymy, ontography and 
ontonomy is not made of characters with a formed identity but rather they are 
haecceities, proper nouns, hurricanes; they are inopportune on a bio-writing 
plane. Life writing, which is auto-biography, hetero-biography and onto-
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biography, would thus be the right place or the environment or the art to 
assemble haecceities for the expressive composition of an inaudible textual life. 
The voice thus opens up, precisely, through the wall of loose stones, channelling 
a multiple voice for the univocity of being: a people. 
 
From equivocity to univocity 
The whole of life is expressed by lines that are voices lying down. It is never 
about the narration of a life lived, the recounting of facts that happened in the 
time of the chronological life of a certain subject or author, but rather of that life 
that affirms – through the force and movement of the digital chronicle he writes, 
inscribes, annotates – that it prolongs itself better in others and is able to 
constitute an autonomous being who, linked by autonomy, is heteronomous, 
because modal; univocal, because singularly neutral; immanent because 
affirmative; a pure difference, a haecceity. 
Multiplicity, for heteronymy and heteronomy, univocity for autonymy (or 
ortonymy) and autonomy, and haecceity for ontonymy and ontonomy. In a final 
analysis, the voice of ontography for the immanence of the expression of the 
being that is voice. The force of a strong thought is in the multiplicity of the 
forces that compose it. When univocity merges into difference, equivocity is one 
of its modes of expression. Thus, the voice of univocity is equivocal, but it is the 
equivocal that affirms the unique difference of that voice. 
 
What Jacques Rancière accuses of being a wall where all Deleuzism thinking no 
longer passes is in fact the composition plane of loose stones which create a 
planomenon, a plateau, a surface that is a plane of immanence and thus delimits 
the interior from the exterior of the language of individual or collective identity, 
of a haecceity or a multiplicity, in other words, of a people always to come. This 
wall is always a topological wall, which can therefore be conceived without 
cardinal points, tributaries of Euclidean geometry. It is a plane that can be 
simultaneously vertical and horizontal, an oblique plane of n dimensions, in 
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which are inscribed the lines of life, the expressive lines of force. It is a pure 
plane of difference where all communities and peoples can individuate as loose 
stones without a cemented wall, establishing differential individuation and 
actualising all the virtuals, all the to-comes in an unstoppable becoming 
constitutive of an inclusive frontier between the various territorialities. Not the 
wall where the thought of a certain Deleuzism collides, but rather a plateau that 
embraces the multiplicities of a people (literary, artistic, philosophical but also 
social, political, aesthetic) to come and already there. 
At the end of his text Deleuze, Bartleby et la formule, Rancière formulated an 
equivocation based on the aporias of the force of a strong thought that, just like 
his own, is an exercise of articulation of free ideas in a movement of singular 
thought. Hence, therefore, the force of Deleuzean thought, and not of a [which?) 
Deleuzism: one single voice for all differences – “Being is said in a single and 
same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it 
is said of difference itself” (Deleuze, 1968, p. 53). Is there a better definition for 
the idea of a European people? Is it not possible for the Europe of today to think 
of this wall of loose stones where borders exist only to be crossed? 
Acknowledgments 
This work was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a 
Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/EAT/04041/2019 
 
References 
Deleuze, Gilles (2006). Cinéma 2, L’image-Temps (ed. orig. 1985). Paris: ed. Minuit, Col. 
Critique. 
Deleuze, Gilles (1993). Critique et Clinique. Paris: Minuit. 
Deleuze, Gilles (2003). Deux Régimes de Fous. Paris: Minuit. 
Deleuze, Gilles (2003). Différence et répétition (ed. orig. 1968). Paris: Minuit. 
Deleuze, Gilles (1984). Francis Bacon – Logique de la sensation. Paris: ed. Éditions de la 
Différence, Col. La Vue le Texte. 
Deleuze, Gilles. (1997). Logique du sens (ed. orig. 1969). Paris: Minuit. 
NOTES ON EUROPE. The Dogmatic Sleep 
Proceedings. Porto, October 29-31 2019 
152 
 
Deleuze, Gilles (2002). Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (ed. orig. 1968). Paris: 
ed. Minuit. 
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix (1997). Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2: Mille plateaux 
(ed. orig 1980). Paris: Minuit. 
Deleuze, Gilles & Guattari, Félix (1991). Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie?. Paris: ed. Minuit. 
Espinosa, Bento de (1992). A Ética. Lisboa: Relógio d’Água. 
Lima, Luís (2008). Estética da Ecceidade, O Traçar de uma Carta. Coimbra: 
MinervaCoimbra. 
Lima, Luís (2013). Ontografias da Imanência (de Deleuze a Proust e volta), respigar, 
compor, expressar. Doctoral thesis in Aesthetics. Faculty of Social Sciences and 
Humanities, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. DOI: 
https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/10188/1/luislima.pdf Acessed on 15/07/19. 
Michaux, Henri (1999). Passages. Cher, ed. Gallimard, col L'Imaginaires. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1996). Ainsi Parlait Zarathoustra (ed. orig. of the French version. 
1969, Aubier). Paris: GF Flammarion. 
Proust, Marcel (1999). À la Recherche du Temps Perdu (text est. 1987-1992). Lonrai, 
ed. Quarto - Gallimard. 
Rancière, Jacques (1998). La Chair des Mots, politiques de l’écriture. Mayenne, ed. 
Galilée. 
Rancière, Jacques (1987). Le Maître ignorant: cinq leçons sur l'émancipation 
intellectuelle. Paris: Arthème Fayard. 
Rancière, Jacques (2010). O Espectador emancipado (ed. orig. 2008). Trans. José 
Miranda Justo. Lisboa: Orfeu Negro. 
 
Author identification 
Luís Lima. PhD in Philosophy – Aesthetics, at FCSH/ New University of Lisbon, under the 
guidance of José Gil (UNL) and Antoine Compagnon (Paris 4 Sorbonne), as a Fellow of 
the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. He was also a Fellow of the Portuguese FCT in the 
Master in Communication, Contemporary Culture and New Technologies from the same 
university. He collaborated as a journalist in several publications and is currently a 
professor at the Autonomous University of Lisbon and at the Polytechnic Institute of 
Cávado and Ave, where he teaches Image Theories, Creative Writing and 
Communication and Digital Storytelling. He also works as a freelance translator in the 
field of contemporary aesthetics and poetry and is a researcher at the IC.Nova and CEAA 
